The importance of cost considerations in the systems engineering process by Hodge, John D.
COST CONSIDERATIONS IN THE SE PROCESS
N 9 3 - 2
THE IMPORTANCE OF COST CONSIDERATIONS INTHE
SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS
by John D. Hodge '_ j / /
One of the most vexing aspects of managing
large programs within NASA (or any other
high technology government programs) is
how to allocate program funds in a way that
is best for the program. One of the major
reasons is that the role of cost changes
throughout the phases of the program. An-
other reason is that total cost is not all that
easy to define; yet another is that funding,
which is based on annual appropriations, is
almost never consistent with fiscally effi-
cient program spending rates. The net result
is that program costs almost always escalate
and inordinate amounts of time are spent
controlling costs at the expense of maintain-
ing performance or schedule.
Many studies have been performed to try
and understand this problem. They show
that program costs will escalate by at least a
factor of three, from approval to completion.
The studies suggest a number of guidelines
that should be followed if costs are to be kept
down, including clear definition of require-
ments, stable management and strong cen-
tral control. Unfortunately, these factors are
not always under the control of the program
manager.
This paper examines the question of cost,
from the birth of a program to its conclusion,
particularly from the point of view of large
multi-center programs, and suggests how to
avoid some of the traps and pitfalls. Empha-
sis is given to cost in the systems engineer-
ing process, but there is an inevitable
overlap with program management. (These
terms, systems engineering and program
management, have never been clearly de-
fined.) In these days of vast Federal budget
deficits and increasing overseas competition,
it is imperative that we get more for each
research and development dollar. This is the
only way we will retain our leadership in
high technology and, in the long run, our
way of life.
BASIC PRINCIPLES
The principles are simple. First, define very
carefully what it is you are trying to do.
Check everything you do against that base-
line, even if it has to be changed, and resist
change once the decisions have been made.
Second, break up the program into manage-
ably sized chunks of deliverables that can be
measured in terms of cost, schedule and per-
formance, and define the interfaces between
the chunks. Third, continuously assess the
risks to success as the program proceeds, and
modify only as necessary.
REQUIREMENTS TRACEABILITY
Most studies have shown that the primary
reason for cost escalation is that not enough
time or resources are spent in defining the
program. It is clear that you cannot control
what you have not or cannot define. It is dur-
ing this period that some of the most elegant
systems engineering should be performed,
especially in understanding the cost of every
requirement and its systems implication.
Even if the definition is adequate during the
early phases of the program, it is imperative
that great vigilance be exercised in main-
taining the baseline definition of the pro-
gram and the fundamental reasons for doing
the program. This process establishes a
small but influential part of the program
office, preferably within the systems engi-
neering organization, dedicated to the trace-
ability of requirements and to ensuring that
a clear path exists from program rationale to
program requirements to systems require-
ments to systems design. Too often, once a
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design has been established, changes are
proposed and enacted that bear little rela-
tionship to the original premises of the
program. As will be discussed later in this
paper, there are many reasons for change,
but where possible, changes should be con-
sidered during the formulation of the pro-
gram and not later when the program struc-
ture is in place and the program is in
progress. Change is almost always costly;
requirements traceability provides a bul-
wark against which the program manager
and the systems engineer can stand and
defend.
BASELINE COST, SCHEDULE AND
PERFORMANCE
The three main parameters in the control
process--cost, schedule and performance--
are the program manager's bread and butter.
Again, program definition is vital and neces-
sary from the very beginning. It may be
argued that clear definition is not possible,
particularly early in the program; never-
theless, an approved, traceable baseline, al-
though it may alter, must be known at any
given time, and must include everything in
the program. The "I forgots" can kill you.
The key to success in handling these
three parameters is to manage the balancing
act between them. Cost, schedule and perfor-
mance are usually dependent variables and
at various times, one or another may assume
greater or lesser importance. A single vari-
able, however, should never be changed
without knowing the impact on the other
two. Within the NASA culture, performance
is generally the predominant factor, and
schedule is a distant second. Cost tends to be
considered mostly in the context of the annu-
al appropriation, but from the point of view
of the program manager, all three param-
eters must be defined and approved continu-
ously, which is a function of the systems
engineering process.
PROGRAM RISK ANALYSIS
In recent years, especially since the Chal-
lenger accident, program risk analysis has
come to be used largely in the context of crew
safety, but this is only a part of program risk.
Basically, program risk analysis assesses the
probability of meeting requirements as
changes occur. A number of analytical tools
now available can be used to understand the
relationships between cost, performance and
schedule. Again, a small group within the
systems engineering organization should be
dedicated to understanding the impact of
any change on all three parameters. Armed
with this information, risk can be reduced in
many ways. Adding more money, reducing
the performance requirements, or extending
the schedule are most often used. A compe-
tent systems engineer will know the rela-
tionships between these three variables and
the impact of any situation on the total pro-
gram.
THE ROLE OF COST IN PHASED
PROCUREMENT
The most common form of procuring high
technology capability within the Federal
Government is known as phased procure-
ment. The theory behind this procurement
method is that commitment to the program
gradually increases with time and in dis-
crete stages. Within NASA, there are four
standard phases; others are beginning to
creep in as the ability to establish new pro-
grams becomes more difficult and the dura-
tion and cost of operations becomes a more
significant part of total program costs. The
role of cost is different in each of the phases.
The phases are:
Pre-phase A: This is a very unstruc-
tured period that examines new ideas,
usually without central control and mostly
oriented toward small studies. This period
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can last for a decade or more and produces
the list of ideas and alternatives from which
new programs are selected.
Phase A: Sometimes called the feasibil-
ity phase, this is a structured version of the
previous phase. Usually a task force or pro-
gram office is established, and multiple con-
tracts will be awarded. The goal of this
phase, which may last for several years but
usually is limited to one or two years, is to
decide whether a new program will be start-
ed and what its purpose and content should
be. This phase represents less than one per-
cent of the total program costs. Nevertheless,
it is largely a systems engineering effort and
sets the stage for everything that follows.
Phase B: Sometimes known as program
definition, this phase is the most important
in establishing the basic parameters of the
program. By the time this phase is finished
(a period of two or three years), the program
rationale, cost, schedule, performance, man-
agement style and the most likely technical
solution will have been established. This
phase usually involves multiple contracts to
establish a variety of ideas and a competitive
environment, should the program proceed.
Cost is continuously assessed as a function of
design solutions relative to basic require-
ments. Studies indicate that from five per-
cent to ten percent of the total program costs
will need to be expended if control is to be
maintained over the program during Phases
C and D.
Phase C/D: Originally separate phases,
this period covers design, development, test
and evaluation. Contracts may be open to all
qualified bidders or only to those involved in
the previous phase. Although competition is
not usually open between Phases C and D,
commitment to Phase D depends on a suc-
cessful and acceptable design. In past pro-
grams, two-thirds of the total program cost
was expended during this period. The sys-
tems engineering role has begun to shift
toward systems specification and systems in-
terfaces. The secret to cost control is a sound
definition of end items and their interfaces
with a tight hold on changes.
Phase E: In most past programs, the op-
erations costs were less than 20 percent of
the total cost. This was because there was a
definite end to a relatively short-term pro-
gram. In recent years, particularly in the
manned programs, the length of the oper-
ational phase has increased significantly. In
the case of the Shuttle, it could be conceived
as indefinitely long. For this reason, life cy-
cle costs should be a major consideration
from the beginning.
SELLING THE PROGRAM
The definition of a new start within NASA
varies by program and organization but can
generally be said to occur at the beginning of
Phase B. Prior to that time, the program
manager is selling the program. The total
expenditure of funds during the selling peri-
od is usually far less than one percent of the
final program costs; this is, however, when
the basic parameters of the program are es-
tablished. It is a time of building constitu-
ents both inside and outside the Agency.
Assuming that a feasible technical solution
is available and an acceptable management
scheme can be provided, much of the debate
about whether a program should be approved
centers largely around the question of cost.
Of course, with only preliminary designs
available, only cost estimates can be made
and these are obtained from standard cost
models.
COST ESTIMATING
During Phase A of the program, when the
most rudimentary designs are available, it is
essential that program cost estimates are
made before the program start can be autho-
rized. Estimates are made using cost models
that have been developed on the basis of past
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experience on similar programs. These
models are among the most arcane devices
invented by engineers, so a few words on how
they work are appropriate.
Past experience is captured by document-
ing the cost of each system on the basis of
weight. Regression analysis is performed to
determine a straight line log relationship.
Once the weight of the system has been esti-
mated, the cost can be determined. This esti-
mate is multiplied by a complexity factor to
allow f_r the risk associated with the select-
ed technology and may vary from as little as
0.50 to 2 or more. This is repeated for each
system, and the total becomes the baseline
cost. This total is multiplied by a factor to
allow for systems engineering and testing by
the prime contractor. This is known as the
"prime wrap" factor and is again determined
based on all relevant past experience. All
prime contractor estimates are added and
then multiplied by a second factor known as
the"nonprime wrap." This is the cost of gov-
ernment work. Finally, a reserve factor is
used to allow for problems during the pro-
gram. There are separate cost models for
manned and unmanned programs, which are
significantly different. In general, for the un-
manned programs, about 40 cents of every
dollar goes to hardware, and in the manned
programs, about 20 cents.
These cost models pose a great many
problems. First, they are normalized on the
basis of weight. Clearly this is not valid in
all cases, particularly structure. Second,
they do not explain why the costs are what
they are. Factors such as management style,
procurement strategy and test philosophy
are not differentiated. Third, they include all
past experience, including errors and over-
runs. In this respect, these cost models
assume no learning curve. As it was in the
beginning, is now, and forever shall be! They
must therefore be used with great caution.
From the systems engineer's point of view,
these cost models can be used to assess the
relative costs of various design solutions; on
a_ absolute basis, however, they are of little
u_e.
So far we have been able to make a tenta-
tive estimate of the cost of the flight system.
To this must be added the cost of new facili-
ties, including launch, test beds, flight oper-
ations, networks and data reduction, among
other factors, and finally the cost of oper-
ations.
It is at this point that the program man-
ager faces the first dilemma: What should be
included in the program cost? That sounds
like a simple question, but it is complicated
by the fact that not all costs are under the
control of the program manager nor is he or
she responsible for justifying all of the asso-
ciated appropriations. For example, launch
costs are provided by the Office of Space
Flight, network costs are provided by the Of-
fice of Operations, and civil service costs are
provided by the research and program man-
agement fund managed by the Office of the
Comptroller. New buildings are provided un-
der the construction of facilities budget. In
addition, most new program managers are
surprised to find that a tax based on the
number of civil servants working on the pro-
gram varies from Center to Center, and nei-
ther the number of people nor the level of tax
is under the control of the program manager.
Taxation without representation! Despite
this dilemma, the systems engineer should
include all of these factors in the cost esti-
mate because the chosen design will affect
all of them; overall program costs are as im-
portant to the Agency as direct program
costs.
Program costs tend to be presented as
only those costs that are under the control of
the program manager. No matter how much
this limitation is stated in presentations, it
is assumed that it is the total program cost
(especially when it is a popular program)
that has the support of the Executive branch,
the Congress and other constituencies. It is
no wonder that the average program in-
creases in cost by a factor of about three from
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the time of approval to completion and that
most program managers during this period
are accused of everything from naivetd to
self-deception to outright lies. There is the
added ethical question that if all costs were
presented, the program would not be ap-
proved!
DEFINING THE PROGRAM
This phase of the program, usually known as
Phase B, will take from one to two years. The
purpose is to take the various concepts con-
sidered in Phase A and select a single valid
solution. By the time Phase B is over, a clear
set of requirements should be available with
a complete set of functional specifications
and a cost estimate based on preliminary de-
sign concepts rather than on cost models.
These are primarily produced by the systems
engineering organization and include at
least one preliminary design and selected
technologies with well-understood risks as-
sociated with those technologies. Don
Hearth, who recently retired from NASA as
director of the Langley Research Center, per-
formed a study on how much this phase has
cost for various past programs as compared
to the success of the program in later phases.
Success was measured as the ability to main-
tain performance, schedule and cost as deter-
mined at the end of Phase B. He concluded
that the most successful programs spent
between five percent and ten percent of the
total program cost in Phase B. The scope was
limited to unmanned programs, but the ra-
tionale can reasonably be extended to man-
ned programs.
Apart from establishing a credible func-
tional system specification, it is essential to
determine the management structure, the
procurement strategy and a baseline cost for
the life of the program, including the cost of
operations. Once again, the primary method
for cost estimating is the cost model, but
there should be sufficient detail available to
check the model with bottom-up costs based
on feasible design solutions. The systems
engineer is responsible for comparing these
two cost estimating techniques. It is unwise
to proceed to the next phases unless some
bottom-up cost estimating has been per-
formed.
Perhaps the most important product of
this phase is a complete work breakdown
structure. Again, this is largely the responsi-
bility of the systems engineering organiza-
tion. The axiom to be followed is, "You
cannot control what you have not defined."
WORK BREAKDOWN STRUCTURE
Too often a program will be approved with-
out a well-established work breakdown
structure (WBS) describing the whole pro-
gram, which inevitably results in large cost
overruns. The WBS is the basis for the pro-
curement strategy and often for the manage-
ment structure. Without it, program changes
will take place after the contractors are in
place and have to be paid. Overlaps between
contracts, as well as missing elements and
contract changes, are always expensive.
The following simple rules have to be fol-
lowed:
1. Each element of the WBS should contain a
deliverable that can be defined.
2. The sum of the WBS elements must be the
total program. (Note that a given program
manager may not have the responsibility for
all elements, but they should each be defined
and allocated.)
3. Each deliverable should be accompanied
by a cost and a schedule. The cost should in-
clude a reserve based on the estimated risk
associated with that element, and the cost
should be allocated to that element.
As simple as these rules sound and as much
as NASA requires contractors to adhere to
119
READINGS IN SYSTEMS ENGINEERING
them, the internal track record is dismal. We
can go a long way toward containing costs if
discipline is established early and main-
tained.
One last word of caution. A WBS element
should never be established on the basis of
function or organization. These elements are
not end items. Other mechanisms exist for
identifying these elements, which in general
could be defined as program overhead and
not entirely the responsibility of the program
manager. They should be recognized for
what they are and identified, but they should
not be included in the WBS.
MANAGING THE PROGRAM
We have now reached the time in the pro-
gram when promises have been made, deals
have been struck, and the program has been
approved. All that remains is to deliver. A
custom within NASA stipulates that new
managers are installed with the belief that
the skills required to sell a program and to
define it are different than those required to
run it. Certainly some changes can be ex-
pected, but I believe that such changes are
better if they occur sometime after a phase
has been entered and the basic management
structures have been established. What the
program needs at this time is ownership of
the concept, and changes in management
will usually result in program changes that
inevitably will lead to increased costs. This
is particularly true of the systems engineer-
ing group that has carefully balanced the
requirements against the design and is fa-
miliar with the "why" of a decision as well as
the "what." So far the total expenditure has
been relatively low, but once the contractors
are onboard and the manpower begins to
build up, costs can escalate at an alarming
rate. In a very short time, increases or de-
creases in performance, extensions or reduc-
tions in schedule, and decreases in annual
funding will all increase cost.
Design to cost. There is much talk about
design to cost but very little action, and for
this there are a number of reasons. Earlier, I
mentioned that within NASA there is a ten-
dency to order the three variables by perfor-
mance first, schedule second, and only then
worry about cost. So by tradition, cost tends
to be put on the back burner. One of the rea-
sons for this is that during the Apollo pro-
gram, the cost function was transferred to
the budget and program control groups. In a
program where the technical problems were
so difficult and the budgets were ample, this
was understandable, but this is no longer the
case. This situation resulted in a shift away
from making the design engineer account-
able for cost as well as performance and
schedule. The second problem occurs when
the cost is not allocated at the WBS element
level, where it can readily be traded against
performance and schedule and easily traced.
I believe that cost must be allocated to the
lowest possible level (a little scary for the
program manager), but unless this is done, it
will be impossible to hold the designer ac-
countable and unlikely that overall costs
will be held in check. The third problem is
that in an organization that prides itself on
technical excellence, it is very difficult not to
make things a little better; consequently,
there are always plenty of ideas around. The
credo of the systems engineer should there-
fore be: "The better is the enemy of the good."
Design to life cycle cost. Over the past
decade, the operational costs of NASA pro-
grams have steadily risen as a percentage of
total program costs. This is largely due to the
fact that programs have a longer life in the
operational phase. Whereas 20 years ago
operational costs amounted to no more than
20 percent of costs, they are now approach-
ing half of the NASA budget. It is time to
place design to life cycle cost on an equal
footing with design to cost. The dilemma is
that a design that allows low-cost operations
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will usually demand higher development
costs and in turn, this means larger front-
end program costs. It is essential that the
systems engineer make these assessments.
The simplest thing for a program manager to
do is walk away from this dilemma and let
the operations people worry about it later.
As this is becoming an overall problem for
the Agency, the ability to make new starts
will depend on the ability to ensure that a
sufficient percentage of the budget is avail-
able for operations. Unfortunately, it is
difficult to get enough operations people to
participate early in the program, but I be-
lieve it is essential. Some kind of veto power
should be established when it comes to mak-
ing design decisions; too many program
managers do not feel responsible for oper-
ations costs and perhaps, what is worse, are
not held accountable for it. Let there be no
doubt that operational costs are unaccepta-
bly high. An operational concept must there-
fore be developed early enough in the pro-
gram to have an effect on the design process.
Change control. Once a program is under-
way, the program manager's responsibility
is controlling change, which is inevitable.
Earlier I said that you cannot control what
you have not defined. It is equally true that
you cannot control changing something that
is not defined. First know what it is! A com-
plete WBS with allocated schedule and cost
is, once again, the key. Change requests
must not be limited to solving a technical
problem. They must be accompanied by cost
and schedule impacts and, just as important,
life cycle cost impacts. In addition, there is
always a rippling cost impact caused by
change. Other WBS elements may be affect-
ed, including items in different contracts or
in totally different NASA codes, or line
items. For these reasons, change must be as-
sessed at the systems engineering level as
well as at the WBS level. Perhaps the over-
riding rule is that changes should be difficult
to approve but easy to implement once the
decision is made.
Managing cost reserves. A qualified cost
estimator would not let a program get start-
ed without making provision for cost over-
runs or reserve. The many uncertainties in a
development program make it essential. An
analysis of past programs allows a fairly
accurate estimate to be made of what is a
reasonable total amount as a percentage of
total costs, assuming that the programs are
similar. Determining how and when the al-
lowance should be allocated is much more
difficult. One school of thought says that
reserves should be held at the highest level
in the program and applied only to correct
unforeseen occurrences. The problem is that
this tends to bail out poor performers. I be-
lieve that the reserve should be determined
based on the perceived risk of the element
when the WBS is formulated. The manager
of the element should then be held responsi-
ble for the stewardship of the reserve. In
order for this to work, some sort of reward
system must be established for the manager
who does not spend the reserve. In any case,
it would be prudent to maintain some re-
serve at the central level for those things
that cannot be anticipated. Just to keep the
system honest, a very simple tracking pro-
gram can be established to follow the expen-
diture of the reserves at the WBS element
level after the fact. I would like to see an in-
depth study done on this subject.
TRAPS AND PITFALLS
So far we have talked about where cost fits
into the program management and systems
engineering processes. There are a few areas
that may catch the program manager unpre-
pared and a few ideas that may be used to
make life a little easier in the future. It may
not be possible to implement all of them, but
it is worth a try.
Buying in. If you are involved in the selling
of the program, the easiest trap to fall into is
underpricing the program. Despite stories to
the contrary, I do not believe that this is a
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matter of deliberate low bidding. Although I
once heard a distinguished gentleman say
that we do business the old fashioned way,
we do underbid and make up on change re-
quests. The fact is that every program man-
ager I have ever met was convinced that he
or she could do it for less than the past record
would suggest. Unfortunately, this usually
involves changing the way we do business. I
believe that there are less expensive ways,
but you should tackle this one at your own
risk and only if you have the support of the
very top of the organization. The systems en-
gineer must be the conscience of the program
manager during this period.
Design to budget. Let us assume that we
have completed a perfect Phase B and that
everything is in place, including the rate of
expenditure by year. It is a virtually certain
that two things will happen. First, with elo-
quent rationales and spreadsheets by the
ton, the various element managers will find
a need to increase their funding allocation.
One favorite argument will be that the sell-
ers of the program, who are no longer in
charge, will be blamed for not understanding
the problem. In addition, Congress may add
a requirement or two. Second, the budget
will be cut in the Agency, at the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), and finally
in Congress. At this point, the intricate pat-
terns of dependency between performance,
cost and schedule begin to unravel. In the
first year, this is not devastating because
you can always delay bringing the prime
contractors on board. But by the time they
arrive, the trap has been set for the most in-
sidious form of management, design to bud-
get. Unfortunately, a fact of life is that very
few research and development (R&D) pro-
grams have multi-year funding, and annual
budgets will be less than planned. The net
effect is that program costs will escalate, and
enormous pressures will attempt to bring
down the annual funding. The first remedy is
to stretch the schedule, and the second is to
reduce the scope of the program. You will no
doubt find yourselves in this position, and
you will receive a great deal of advice from
the nonparticipants, but you should beware
of "descoping." A cursory examination of the
cost models will show that in the manned
programs, only 20 cents of every dollar go to
hardware. (In the unmanned programs, the
number is closer to 40 cents.) Once the man-
agement structure is in place and the con-
tracts have been awarded, virtually all of the
other costs are fixed or very difficult to
reduce. Take out all the content and the pro-
gram cost will still be 80 percent of the
estimate! The lesson is that if you are forced
to remove content, you should be sure to take
out every cent that is associated with that
content: prime wraps, nonprime wraps, test
beds, personnel, and, if necessary, the kitch-
en sink. It will be difficult to find, but it will
be worth the effort. If this were a mystery
novel, it might well be called "The Case of
the Missing 80 Percent." Where does it all
go, and why is it only 60 percent for
unmanned programs? Much of this is valid
and accounts for systems engineering and
integration at all levels of the program,
including test and evaluation, operations,
and many other things. But it also accounts
for duplication of test facilities, overlaps
between assignments, management style,
inefficiencies and a host of hidden costs asso-
ciated with maintaining the institutions
that are often invisible to the program man-
ager. The systems engineer is responsible for
ferreting out the good from the bad. It is a
simple fact that the first one percent reduc-
tion in these wraps (80 percent to 79 percent)
increases the amount of hardware by five
percent (20 percent to 21 percent)! A 20 per-
cent improvement in the wraps (80 percent
to 60 percent) results in a doubling of the
hardware (20 percent to 40 percent) or cut-
ting the program costs in half for the same
amount of hardware! "Thar's gold in them
thar hills."
The UPN System. The NASA budget is
prepared and submitted using a system of
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breakdowns known as the unique project
number (UPN) system. All parts of the agen-
cy are required to report their annual needs
on the basis of this system, including the pro-
gram offices. From a program point of view,
a fatal flaw in this process is the numbering
system, which generally describes functions
rather than end items and is therefore not in
consonance with the principles of a WBS sys-
tem. It is essential that the program man-
ager be able to trace the equivalence of the
UPN number and its corresponding WBS
element. This will require a joint effort
between systems engineering and the pro-
gram control people. Without this traceabil-
ity matrix, the program manager will not
know what is being asked for or where the
money is going. Too often the UPN number
is perceived as directly equivalent to the
WBS element, but this is very seldom the
case unless the WBS is not end-item orient-
ed. (The latter happens more often than it
should.) One way to avoid this situation is to
make the annual budget call for the program
using the WBS system and then translate it
to thv UPN system for the purpose of aggre-
gating the total NASA budget. I have never
seen this happen.
The cost of operations. I mentioned earlier
that the costs of operations are now about 50
percent of the NASA budget. This is partly
due to the increase in the operational life of a
program and to the fact that we have not
learned to design systems for operability. It
has not been necessary in the past. It is also
true that the productivity of the operations
infrastructure has not been high on the pro-
gram manager's list. If we are to reduce total
program costs, which are vital to the Agency
and to the program, it is time to strike a new
level of cooperation between these two nor-
mally separate parts. The program and the
systems engineer must assume a large part
of the responsibility.
THE INSTITUTION AND THE PROGRAM
Although not directly related to the systems
engineering process, a number of things bear
directly on the program and have a major
effect on the ability to perform the various
program functions. These generally concern
the relationship between the program and
the institution. NASA was originally
established using the resources of the Na-
tional Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
(NACA), an aeronautical research organiza-
tion that was seldom involved in large
development programs. The budget was rel-
atively small, and there were few contrac-
tors. In fact, all contracts were signed at the
Washington office, the NACA equivalent of
Headquarters. It quickly became apparent
that, in addition to the research centers, a
development center was needed. The God-
dard Space Flight Center (GSFC) was estab-
lished to perform this function. This was
rapidly followed by the Lyndon B. Johnson
Space Center (JSC) in Houston, the George
C. Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in
Huntsville, and the Jet Propulsion Laborato-
ry (JPL) in Pasadena. Almost immediately,
GSFC and JPL became responsible for multi-
ple unmanned programs, which were largely
contained within a single Center, and JSC
and MSFC became responsible for multi-
center manned programs. In both cases,
program offices were established and the
Centers provided the resources, both person-
nel and facilities, to support the program.
With the exception of JPL, which was a fed-
erally funded research and development
center and operated outside the civil service
system, all NASA personnel and basic facili-
ties are funded separately from the programs
in line items known as Research and Pro-
gram Management (RPM) and Construction
of Facilities (CoF). Program-specific facili-
ties are funded by the program and these
facilities are most often operated by support
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contractors, also funded by the program.
This system was established so that the pro-
grams would be managed by government
personnel who would rotate from program to
program and carry their experience with
them. This worked very well until the late
1960s when the budget began to fall rapidly,
and there was a significant reduction in
NASA personnel. By the early seventies,
both the budget and the number of personnel
had been cut in half, but the number of
Centers remained essentially the same. The
cost of maintaining the institution could not
longer be sustained by the RPM and CoF line
items. The solution was to tax the programs
based on the number of personnel that were
applied to the program. Unfortunately, the
program manager does not decide how many
people should work on the program, which,
by tradition, is the responsibility of the
Center director. Neither does the program
manager participate in determining the
level of the tax. These decisions, again by
tradition, are made by the comptroller.
MAINTAINING THE INSTITUTION
Unless the basic system of funding personnel
is changed, the programs will most certainly
be responsible for funding some of the insti-
tutional costs that are not related to the pro-
gram; the RPM budget will never be allowed
to grow to compensate for this. The question
is rather how large the institution needs to
be to support the program and how that deci-
sion is made. I mentioned earlier that the
WBS should represent the totality of the
program and should always describe deliver-
ables; this problem runs counter to that
principle. I believe that the solution lies in
accepting this cost for what it is, negotiating
the level of tax with the program manager
for the duration of the program, and taking
it offthe top each year. It may not be control-
lable in the normal sense, but at least it is a
known number.
Personally, I believe that the Agency
would be better served if the development
centers were managed using an industrial
funding system similar to JPL and many
other government facilities, including the
Navy labs. But until that happens, it will be
necessary to find some balance between the
institutional and program needs.
MANAGEMENT STABILITY
Every program will change management
during its life cycle. The common practice in
NASA has been to make these changes delib-
erately between phases. It is not uncommon
to see as many as four different managers
during a program, including a specialist in
closing off completed programs. The positive
side to this is that it is possible to match the
needs of each phase of a program to the
special capabilities within the agency. The
negative side is that each manager has a
different style, each program has different
management needs, and often these do not
match when the change-over occurs between
phases. One way is not always right and an-
other always wrong, but each is different,
and changes even in management style can,
and usually do, increase the cost of the pro-
gram. The secret then is to stick with a team
as long as possible, particularly the systems
engineering team, something that is easy to
say and difficult to do in these times of
declining internal expertise and increasing
retirements.
THE TYRANNY OF EXPERIENCE
Too often, you will find resistance to change
in the way things are done. "We have always
been successful (measured by performance)
doing it this way, and its very dangerous to
change winning ways." "If it ain't broke,
don't fix it." "You get no credit for an on-time
failure." All true and at the same time, de-
structive to valid new ways of doing busi-
ness, especially when it comes to introducing
more efficient or less expensive ways. When
the space program started, we had no
experience and what followed was the most
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innovative and exciting period in the history
of high technology programs. But now we
have all that experience, and it has become a
burden. By all means, you should keep the
wise heads around (they may still save you),
but take advantage of the explosion in new
technologies and capabilities, which allows
for things that we could only dream of 30
years ago. You should be careful before you
introduce a change, but you should not dis-
miss it out of hand.
DOES IT MATTER?
We have been in the civilian space business
for almost 40 years, and time after time we
have shown that we can rise to any challenge
and lead the competition, provided we have
the resources. Time and time again the Fed-
eral Government has provided the resources.
We have been the envy of the world. We have
written the book on the subject, both from a
technical and a management sense.
Until now, it was enough to know that we
were the best. There was no established
competition, most of the money was spent
internally, and cost efficiency was second to
performance. Some have characterized it as
a Works Projects Administration (WPA) for
the technologists! The problem is that in this
era of budget deficits and trade deficits,
there is not enough discretionary money to
go around. Even without international com-
petition, it would be imperative to get more
out of our research dollars. The trouble is
that we have learned profligate ways, as
neither the government nor the contractors
give rewards for cost efficiency. And while
we were basking in thisglory,the rest of the
world has been catching up. They have been
reading the book, and the competition, sup-
ported by their governments, is getting good
and fierce.
But there is a difference;the competition
believes that the space business is here to
stay. I said space business, but I meant com-
merce, and in commerce cost efficiency is
paramount. Do we stillwant to stay at the
top, or are we ready to leave itto the rest of
the world? Are we prepared to do what is
necessary to stay in the game? After all,it's
only a space program. Does it matter? You
bet!
CAN ANYTHING BE DONE?
In this paper, I have attempted to show
where cost fits into the space program's engi-
neering and management business. A combi-
nation of things have placed cost at the
bottom of the priority ladder except in mat-
ters of the inexorable annual budget. There
are many ways to improve cost efficiency,
some of which are available to the program
manager. In the long run, it will take a con-
certed effort by all of us to make a difference.
The Executive branch and Congress, togeth-
er with industry and academia, must work
as before, when we perceived that we were
second. In the meantime, I hope that I have
been able to give the budding systems engi-
neer and program manager a few tips to do
something about the problem of cost consid-
erations. We can only do something about it
if we want to!
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